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Abstract
Underpricing signifies that IPO share prices do not reflect the fundamental value of the listed company. Corporate governance plays an 
essential role in IPOs where the board of directors, the independent board of directors, and the board of supervisors are significant elements 
of accurate share pricing. The study investigates the underpricing phenomena and short-term performance of the IPO companies during the 
listing process in the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE). The work outcomes illustrate the role of the corporate organizational structure 
in the period of the IPO process that may attract potential investors. The hypothesis testing is conducted with a multiple regression model 
including 100 observations from enterprises doing IPO listed on HOSE. The study results generate signals for the investors and regulators 
that the board of directors holds a strong negative influence on the underpricing process. Secondly, the level of the independent board of 
directors and stock exchange in itself has no significant impact on the underpricing process. Underpricing is one of the many anomalies of 
the stock exchanges that provide wrong signals for the market participants. Identifying stock prices that reflect their intrinsic value is an 
ongoing debate among scholars, investors, and other market participants.
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1. Introduction
For many reasons, the pricing of goods and services 
is a complex affair. Demand uncertainty and information 
asymmetry heightened the complexity of this task much 
further. The pricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) also 
does not escape from this fact. IPO is a practice of issuing 
and selling new equity by a firm on the public stock 
market for the first time. While the main reason for going 
to the public is raising capital to the firm and creating the 
opportunity for existing shareholders to convert some of 
their wealth into cash at a future date, non-financial reasons 
such as increasing publicity also play some minor roles 
(Ritter & Welch, 2002).
Numerous empirical studies have shown that, even 
though there is a significant degree of variation on its 
extent, on average IPOs underpricing has been observed 
all over the world, across time. In their summary of several 
IPO empirical studies across 25 countries, Loughran, Ritter, 
and Rydqvist (1994) reported average country-level initial 
returns ranging from 4.2% (France) to 80.3% (Malaysia). 
According to Ljungqvist (2007), while the average 
underpricing in USA IPO markets fluctuates between 10% 
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and 20% range, it is considerably lower in France and 
Germany and higher in Asia. Analyzing a sample of 6,249 
IPOs, Ritter and Welch (2002) noted an 18.8% average 
first-day returns between the years 1980 to 2001. They 
also stated that this rate has been fluctuating across time: 
increasing from 7.4% in 1980 to 11.2% in the early 1990s, 
18.1% in the middle of 1990s, to 65.0% in 1999 and 2000 
before falling back to 14.0 % in 2001.
Regarding Asian IPO markets, even though the studies 
conducted in these markets are not as extensive as in the 
USA and European IPO markets, the ones undertaken have 
documented a higher underpricing level than those of more 
developed economies. By examining the performance of 
IPOs in the USA, the United Kingdom, and Japanese market, 
Jenkinson (1990) finds that, while the discount in the United 
States and the United Kingdom, on average, is around 10% 
and 7%, respectively, Japanese IPO rose in price by nearly 
55% after one week. Moshirian et al. (2010) also find an 
average IPO initial return of around 202.63% in China, 
70.30% in Korea, 61.81% in Malaysia, 21.43% in Hong 
Kong, 34.04% in Japan, and 33.10% in Singapore. They also 
noted a higher initial underpricing in the emerging Asian 
market than in developed Asian markets.
Different nonexclusive theories have been proposed 
for explaining IPO underpricing. Loosely, this explanation 
can be classified into four broad categories: information 
asymmetry, institutional illustrations, behavioral descrip-
tions, and ownership control.
There are three essential parties involved in IPO markets: 
the issuing firm, the bank underwriting and marketing the 
deal, and investors (Ljungqvist, 2007; Ritter, 2003). The 
basic assumption of information asymmetry-based theories 
of IPOs underpricing is that one of these parties is better 
informed than the other. Nevertheless, there is a wide range 
of views on which party has the information advantage over 
the rest. While the principal-agent model, proposed by Baron 
and Holmstrom (1980) and later by Baron (1982), stresses that 
the better-informed party is the underwriter, Rock’s (1986) 
Winner’s Curse portrays the existence of some investors 
who have superior information over all other investors as 
well as the issuing firm and the underwriter (which are 
assumed as “invisible intermediary” in this model). On the 
other hand, the Signaling theory (Allen & Faulhaber, 1989; 
Grinblatt & Hwang, 1989) posits that issuers of IPOs are 
more informed than investors and the underwriters. There 
is also no agreement on whether IPOs underpricing is a sort 
of compensation for the resulting uncertainty (as argued by 
Winner’s Curse models) or an incentive to avoid it (Book-
building theory) or even a signal about the issuing firm 
quality (Signaling theory).
On the other hand, institutional explanations account 
IPOs underpricing to institutional factors like lawsuits, 
taxes, and price stabilization. In this spectrum, while 
some argue that underpricing serves as insurance against 
future litigation (Hensler, 1995; Tinic, 1988), others 
relate underpricing to price support services provided 
by underwriters concerning post-IPO price stabilization 
underpricing (Benveniste, Busaba, & Whilhelm, 2002). 
Some also explained under-pricing as a consequence of 
its tax benefits for the issuing firm.
The basic argument of behavioral-based explanations is 
the presence of ‘irrational’ investors who either abandoned 
their information to go with the flow or hold optimistic 
beliefs about the prospects for the IPO company merely 
based on their feelings.
Following the decision to go public, separation of 
ownership and control of the firm would be inevitable. 
Theories based on ownership and corporate control describe 
Underpricing as a subsequent separation, an attempt by the 
owner to maximize their managerial control (Brennan & 
Franks, 1997) or to minimize the agency costs (Stoughton 
& Zechner, 1998).
Considering the Asian IPOs, given that it is an emerging 
market, empirical studies have found that the corporate 
governance aspect of the firm plays a significant role 
in IPO pricing. Despite the fact that the direction of the 
effect is inconclusive, the firm’s ownership structure and 
its board composition proved to be the most effective 
internal governance mechanisms in determining the level of 
Underpricing by previous literature. Therefore, the present 
study aims to empirically examine the influence of this 
aspect of the firm on IPOs underpricing by focusing on some 
board characteristics, namely, its size and independence, and 
the audit committee.
With the relationship between board size and IPO 
underpricing, two opposing presumptions can be made. 
On the one hand, a firm may use the size of its board as 
a signal to indicate its access to critical external ties and 
resources, which leads to a positive association between 
underpricing and board size. On the other hand, according to 
agency theory, a larger board size can be subject to agency 
costs. Moreover, it can also reduce uncertainties associated 
with young firms (Yatim, 2011), hence a negative correlation. 
However, most of the studies reviewed here document a 
negative association (Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 2001; Darmadi 
& Gunawan, 2013; Hidayat & Kusumastuti, 2015).
Board independence is the other corporate governance 
mechanism usually discussed in the literature. It refers to the 
proportion of independent outside members of the board. 
Often, board independence is considered a signal to effective 
control mechanisms and hence increases firm value. In line 
with this perception, Howton, Howton, and Olson (2001) 
reported a direct relationship between a percentage of 
independent outsiders and initial day return.  Examining 
Indonesian IPO firms, Darmadi and Gunawan (2013) also 
find a positive association between board independence 
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and IPO underpricing. Contrary to these, Certo et al. (2001) 
and Afza, Yousaf, and Alam (2013) find that the proportion 
of outsiders on the board seems to increase, rather than 
decrease, the level of underpricing.
The audit committee’s primary responsibility is monito-
ring compliance with internal regulations and ensuring the 
overall effectiveness of firms’ internal controls.  In the context 
of IPO, the presence of an audit committee can decrease 
the uncertainty generated by information asymmetry and 
hence reduce underpricing. Contrary to this, Dimovski and 
Kelly (2004) reported a negative association between the 
two. Besides, Bedard, Coulombe, and Courteau (2008) and 
Hidayat and Kusumastuti (2015) find insignificant effect. 
But  Bedard et al. (2008) noted that if the audit committee 
members are independent and have expertise in financial 
matters, the level of underpricing of the IPO decreases.
Overall, despite the growing body of literature on the 
issue, the direction of the corporate governance variable’s 
effect in previous studies has been inconclusive. Therefore, 
using data from the frontier market (Vietnam) in this paper 
aims to investigate the issue further.
2. Research Methodology 
In this study, the quantitative approach and the aim 
of the research are explanatory. The data used are cross-
sectional data. The samples are the top 100 largest listed 
companies in the Ho Chi Minh stock exchange (VN100). 
The 100 constituents are selected as of December 31, 
2019, and the data used are the quantitative data from 
the companies’ prospectus. Notably, the IPO and listing 
process in the Vietnam stock market is hugely different 
from other markets. Usually, when the companies conduct 
the IPOs to transfer from private to public equity, they 
will be listed on the stock exchange quickly. It means 
that the IPO and listing process could be conducted 
simultaneously, while the Vietnamese companies have to 
operate separately. The majority of Vietnamese companies 
are state-owned enterprises. When they conduct 
equitizations with the IPO process, the listing stage would 
be performed two or three years later. Therefore, this 
study will focus on the listing period with the first trading 
day and listing prospectus in the Vietnam stock market. 
The data are analyzed regressively regarding the stages of 
classical assumption testing.
  1 0 0( ) / 100%IR Pt Pt Pt= − ×  (1)
Description: 
IR : Initial return 
Pt0: IPO listing price
Pt1:  closing price on the first trading day of the secondary 
market. 
This model will be analyzed thoroughly with the model 
from Mnif (2009):
 




BSβ β β β
β β β




Underprice: Underpricing level measured by IR 
model (1). 
Bsize: The board size
Indead: The number of independent boards 
BS:  Board of supervisors, measured by 
using dummy variable (1.0) with the 
value of 1 if the firm has Board of 
supervisors coming during IPO listing 
and 0 if vice versa. 
Age: The difference between the year of the 
firm establishment and the year of the IPO
Fsize: Firm size
Lev: The firm’s debt ratio
Mnif (2009) shows that the board size has a positive 
influence on the level of underpricing. According to 
Darmadi and Gunawan (2012), the board size variable has 
a significant relationship with underpricing; a large number 
of boards are expected indirectly to reduce information 
asymmetry between the firm conducting IPO listing and 
potential investors. 
Moreover, Mak, Tan, Tan, and Tee (2003) document 
that the corporate governance’s influence on the stock 
price at the time of IPO and listing indicates the board size 
has a negative correlation to the premium stock price and 
even premium market price. Widagdo, Rahmawati, Murni, 
and Ratnaningrum (2021) also find that board members 
have a significant influence on stock price and earnings 
management as well as transparent disclosure. The board 
size could be considered to influence the premium stock 
price and premium market price negatively. Therefore, the 
first hypothesis is proposed as follow:
H1: The board size has a negative influence on 
underpricing. 
Besides, the independent degree of the board of 
directors, called board independence or outside directors, 
could significantly negatively affect the magnitude of 
underpricing (Anis, 2009). These statements are also in line 
with Darmadi and Gunawan (2012), who demonstrated that 
the board independence is negatively correlated to the level 
of underpricing. Moreover, the role of board independences 
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could be shown as transparent advisors to support and provide 
effective strategies to chairmen and management levels in 
order to achieve good corporate governance (Rustam & 
Narsa, 2021), then the second hypothesis is as follows:
H2: The board independence could have a negative 
influence on underpricing. 
Additionally, the board of supervisors plays a critical 
component in the corporate governance structure to create 
a signal investment for investors regarding the company’s 
quality and information in the prospectus (Shakhatreth 
& Alsmadi, 2021). According to Bedard et al. (2008), the 
supervisory board’s presence significantly influences under-
pricing level during the company’s IPO. Therefore, the third 
hypothesis is as follows:
H3: The board of supervisors has a significantly negative 
influence on underpricing. 
3. Results and Discussion
The samples used in this study are public companies 
that conducted a listing in the Ho Chi Minh stock exchange 
(HOSE) with the 100 largest listed companies (VN100) 
on 31/12/2019. These listed companies accounted for 
70%–80% of market capitalization in HOSE, which 
measures the performance of VN30 and VNMidcap. The 
Vietnam stock market is only 20 years old and is still ranked 
as the frontier market by MSCI and FTSE. This stock market 
still has significant gaps in listing quality regarding market 
classification, corporate governance, financial ratio, and 
disclosure. VN100 could be considered as the best index 
and market’s benchmark to be the samples. Because these 
companies have large market capitalization and comply with 
corporate governance and listing regulations, gaps would be 
minimized in comparisons between listed companies.
Based on the figures in Table 1, the average variable 
value of underpricing (UP) is around 32%; in other words, 
the average stock price selected as samples at the time of 
listing increased by 32% from the closing price on the first 
day of trading on. The number also shows that the level of 
underpricing happened in the sample firms is from 4.2% to 
55%. It also indicates that the underpricing level is higher 
than the research conducted by Tran and Duong (2013) in 
the Vietnam stock market from 2005 to 2012. 
The average value of board size (Bsize) is around 5.72 
and nearly equal to 6. This research indicates that the 
average number of board members’ sample companies is 
five people, including independent and dependent BODs. 
Since Decree 71/2017-NDCP was issued by the Vietnamese 
Government in 2017, the listed companies tried to increase 
the level of compliance with various corporate governance 
rules applicable to public joint-stock companies.
The Indead variable is researched about the independent 
board of directors (BODs) in a firm measured by the 
percentage of independent BODs on the number of BODs. 
The independent board of directors plays a pivotal role 
to monitor and evaluate the performance of the board of 
management. However, the average value of the board 
independence is around 31.2% means, which the average 
proportion of board independence in a company is 31.2% of 
the total number of BODs. 
The board of supervisors (BS) variable is a dummy 
variable with the criteria if the company has a board of 
supervisors in the period of listing that will be given a value 
of one and zero if the other way around. BS variable has 
an average value of 65.1% of companies have a board of 
supervisors, and nearly 35% of firms do not have a board 
of supervisors in their corporate governance structure during 
the listing period. 
Referring to sample selection, this research chooses 100 
companies as sample criteria. After the statistical model test 
consisting of partial significance test (Test T), simultaneous 
significance test (Test F), and the model relevance test or 
the coefficient of determination (R2), the result of data 
processing can be viewed in Table 2. 
Table 1: The Descriptive Statistics from the Dependent Variable of Underpricing from the Firm Samples in VN100 
Variables Mean Median Modus Max Min Std. Deviation
Up 0.3205 0.2129 0.5221 0.5518 0.0428 0.2284
Bsize 5.7287 5.0000 5.0000 10.0000 4.0000 2.8055
Indead 0.3122 1.0000 0.3333 0.6565 0.0000 0.1011
BS 0.6519 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.7629
Age 16.6520 14.7820 5.8121 105.0800 0.0000 14.7720
Fsize 3.06E+12 7.20E+11 0.0000 7.07E+13 2.12E+10 1.19E+13
Lev 0.8083 0.8180 0.5059 1.8139 0.0627 0.2412
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According to Table 2, the value of R2 is 0.190, and this 
means that the underpricing variable can be interpreted by the 
variations of the independent variable, including the board 
size, independent board of directors, board of supervisors, 
firm size, and the leverage of 19%; however, the rest of 
factors is not included in this study that accounts for 81%. 
Furthermore, the value of adjusted R2 in this study 
indicates the need for additional independent variables, 
shown by the smaller value of adjusted R2 than the value 
of R2. Additionally, the t statistic test is taken to show how 
significant effects on an individual or partial independent 
variable on explaining the influence of the dependent 
variables. Regarding the t-test, the considerable level is 1% 
and 5%, depending on the probability value at t-stat. 
In terms of the regression results, the t-stat value for 
variable Bszie is around –3.344 with a probability value of 
0.0051, which means that the Bsize variable has a negative 
coefficient on underpricing and gets a significant influence 
on a = 1%. It can be said that the research’s results tend to 
support the research hypothesis H1, which means that the 
board size has a negative effect on underpricing, so that 
the higher number of board of directors, the smaller level 
of underpricing would be. It means that the board size 
could decrease the information asymmetry in the investors’ 
minds. The negative correlation between the board size and 
underpricing shows that with the greater board size, each 
member in the board will contribute outcomes differently. 
Additionally, the large size of the board can be more effective 
in increasing the role of corporate governance structure 
in the company; it may help decrease the information 
asymmetry in the stock market and the dictatorship in 
management. Based on Xie, Davidson, and Dadalt’s (2001) 
research regarding profit management, the large board 
size tends to have independent directors more experienced 
in the financial industry. Hence, a greater board size could 
be better in reducing the firm’s profit management. Mnif 
(2009) and Hearn (2011) also found that the board size 
has a significant coefficient of negative influence on the 
underpricing. Besides that, Xie et al. (2001) also found that 
board size has a significant negative impact on underpricing. 
Those studies illustrate that the number of board directors 
plays a crucial role in decreasing corporate information 
asymmetry. The board size could measure the ability of 
coordination and communication. Another research from 
Mak et al. (2003) also found that the board size, as a part 
of the corporate governance structure with a negative 
correlation to the premium stock offering price as well as the 
premium market price, tending to the greater the board size, 
the stock price at the time of the listing and IPO to be lower, 
so the higher the level of underpricing. 
Based on the figures in Table 2, the Indead variable 
shows the t-stat value of –1.59, including a probability value 
of 0.199. It means that the Indead variable has a negative 
correlation and no significant effect. Hence, hypothesis 
H2 could be not supported by this result, meaning that 
the independent board of directors would not influence 
the underpricing of a firm doing IPO and listing. It also 
illustrates that the independence level of the board of 
directors could not fully control tasks from corporate 
management. Remarkably, the independent board of 
directors could not control the firm’s ability to decrease 
fraud in the financial reports and internal cross trading. In 
this empirical research, it could be showed that the lowest 
value of the Indead variable explaining the dependent board 
Table 2: The Result of the Model Regression of the Research 
Variables Coefficient Std. Error t+Standard Prob
Bsize –0.03737 0.00955 –3.3447 0.0051**
Indead –0.19991 0.19521 –1.5922 0.1995
BS 0.04233 0.04872 0.9912 0.5186
Age 0.00212 0.00192 0.3129 0.8988
Fsize 5.11E-16 1.91E-15 0.3966 0.8955
Lev –0.22191 0.07552 –3.1123 0.03118*





Note: *Shows significance level at 5% and ** 1%.
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of directors is 0, while the maximum value is around 65%. 
It also illustrates that many firms will be public companies 
in listing IPOs period without the independent board of 
directors. Yatim (2011) and Hidayat and Kusumastuti (2015) 
also found the same results in Malaysian Stock Market and 
Indonesia Stock Market, where they have some same points 
in corporate governance structures.
Additionally, the role of an independent board of directors 
could not be found an underpricing level during the first 
listing IPO. The old board of directors and founder can be 
reliable to run businesses than younger ones. Furthermore, 
the group of founders and owners tend to do not have 
other guys like an independent board of directors in their 
companies (Yatim, 2011). 
 In Table 2, the t-stat value for the BS variable is 0.99 
with the probability value of 0.51, meaning that the variable 
AC has a positive correlation without a significant influence 
on the a = 5%. The results could not support the hypothesis H3, 
meaning that the existence of the board of supervisors could 
not influence underpricing when the firms are doing IPO 
listing. According to Mnif (2009), the board of supervisors 
can influence underpricing during the listing period. The 
board of supervisors cannot be used as a signal, which the 
listed companies have run their monitoring function well and 
are also very useful for investor relation directors to persuade 
investors to buy their stock offering. Therefore, it may be 
caused by many Vietnamese listed companies that are less 
aware of the corporate governance structure’s importance. 
The corporate governance’s standards have many limitations 
in the Vietnam stock market, particularly the role of the 
independent board of directors and board of supervisors. 
In this empirical research, the concept of corporate 
governance could be explained its effect on underpricing. 
Effective corporate governance is showed capable of 
explaining and affect underpricing as well as capable of the 
company model to decrease the information asymmetry and 
increase transparency for investors. 
4. Conclusion
This research’s results show that the size of the board 
of directors directly influences the level of underpricing, 
while the independent board of directors, known as outside 
directors, does not have a significant influence on the level 
of underpricing. Moreover, the board of supervisors also 
does not play an essential element for a considerable effect 
on underpricing. As a result, the listed companies may focus 
on a corporate governance structure to signal investors and 
particular global investors about the company’s performance. 
The more significant number of directors may influence the 
lower level of underpricing and help reduce the level of 
corporate information asymmetry. In this study, the results 
could contribute to researchers and regulators concerning 
the influence of corporate governance structure on the 
underpricing of stock price. Typically, the effective corporate 
governance implementation could reduce the information 
asymmetry and increase transparent disclosure for investors. 
In particular, it could show potential problems from corporate 
governance structure to help regulators improve the level of 
policies. However, this research also has some limitations 
regarding samples and timeframe. Future studies should use 
more extended intervals periods and more models to create a 
comprehensive picture to illustrate the vital role of corporate 
governance in the Vietnam stock market. 
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